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A COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE: A VALID
RESTRICTION ON SALE OF VESSEL
HAROLD B. WAHL*
The question of how far contractual. obligations can be made to
run with property other than land is of great and wide interest. It has
been the subject of many judicial decisions and law review articles.
Here we are concerned with a rather narrow facet of the general
problem, that is, how far a restrictive covenant - a covenant not to
compete - may validly run with the sale of a vessel, or be enforced in
equity as a personal covenant, and bind parties having notice but not
expressly agreeing thereto.
The Supreme Court of the United States in an early case' upheld
as valid a stipulation by the vendor of a vessel that the vessel should
not be used within a reasonable region or distance so as not to interfere
with vendor's business or trade. There the Supreme Court flatly upheld
as valid a provision in a contract for the sale of a vessel, that the vessel
should not be used for ten years in the waters of California where the
vendor operated. A later decision of the Supreme Court to the same
general effect is Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay.2 In this case the Supreme
Court held that whatever difference of opinion there might be with regard
to the scope of the Sherman anti-trust law, there had been no intimation
from anyone that such a contract, made as part of the sale of a business,
and not as a device to control commerce, would fall within the act.
Such provisions are regarded as an ancillary restriction and thus outside
the anti-trust laws. They are governed by state law, which universally
recognizes them as valid.3
Assuming, then, the seller of a vessel can properly bind the purchaser
by such a restrictive covenant, reasonable in time and extent, we come
to the fundamental question of whether such a restriction is binding
upon a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee who has lknowledge of it but
does not specifically agree to it.
Restrictions on the use of land, binding in equity on successors in
interest who have notice, have been universally upheld by the courts since
Tulk v. Moxhay.4 The question narrows itself as to whether personal
*Chairman, Admiralty Law Committee, Florida Bar.
1. Oregon Steam Nay. Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64 (1874).
2. 200 U.S. 179 (1906).
3. Recognition of this principle in Florida is illustrated by recent decisions. E.g.,
Tri-Continental Financial Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enterprises, Inc. 265 F.2d 619
(5th Cir. 1959), West Shore Restaurant Corp. v. Turk, 101 So.2d 123 (F1a. 1958);
Janet Realty Corp. v. lloffman's Inc., 154 Fla. 144, 17 So.2d 114 (1944).
4. 2 Phil. Ch. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
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property is sufficiently different from real estate so that there should be
a different rule of law.
Lord Coke gives the classic statement of the rule that covenants do
not run with chattels as follows:
"*** [I]f a man be possessed of .. .a horse, or any other chattell
reall or personal!, and give or sell his whole interest or propertie
therein upon condition that the donee or vendee shall not alien
the same, the same is void, because his whole interest and
propertie is out of him, so as he bath no possibilitie of reverter,
and it is against trade and traffique, and bargaining and contracting
between man and man ....
Numerous decisions seem to support this general principle as to
restrictions on real and personal property being treated differently.8 But
there is good authority to the contrary. As to ships the authorities are
definitely to the contrary, as hereinafter discussed.
The fundamental question from the point of view of their enforce-
ability is whether the real purpose of such restrictions-a business purpose
-is important enough to outweigh the property owner's interest in the
unrestricted use of his chattels. 7 Commercial exigencies have permitted
the courts to enforce, as against purchasers with notice, a restriction that a
iuke box should be maintained in the place of business of the defendant's
assignor;8 restriction that a film of a prize fight could be exhibited
exclusively by the plaintiff;9 a restriction that printing plates for a prayer
book could be used exclusively by the plaintiff for printing the book;10
a restriction that the plaintiff was entitled to exclusive use of a special
printing press attachment; a restriction against resale of export cigarettes
in the United States;1 2 and a restriction that reduced rate excursion railroad
tickets would not be transferred.' 3
5. CoKE ON LITTIETON, § 369 (Small 1853).
6, E.g., Straits v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 US. 490, 500-01 (1917):
Hartford Charga-Plate Associates v. Youth Centre-Cinderella Stores, 215 F.2d 668
(2d Cir. 1954); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F,2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert, denied,
311 US. 712 (1940); Universal Film Mfg. Co. v, Copperman, 218 Fed. 577 (2d Cir.
1914): John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Ilartman, 153 Fed. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907); In re
Consolidated Factors Corp., 46 F,2d 561, 563 (S.DN.Y. 1931); National Skee-Ball
Co. v. Seyfried. 110 N. J. Eq. 18, 158 Atd. 736 (1932).
7. See Chafec, Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HAv I,. REv. 1250, 1262
(1956).
8. Pratte v. Balatsos, 99 N.H. 430, 113 A,2d 492 (1955); cf', Melodies, Inc. v.
Mirabile, 4 Misc. 2d 1062, 163 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Albany City Ct. 1957) (juke box
covenant: action for damages against promisor).
9. Gillingham v. Ray. 157 Mich. 488, 122 N.V. 111 (1909).
10. Murphy v. Christian Press Ass'n. Publishing Co., 38 App. Div. 426, 56
N.Y.Supp. 597 (1899); cf. In re Rider, 16 RI 271, 15 Atl. 72 (1888).
11. New York Bank-Note Co. v. lamilton Bank-Note Engraving & Printing Co.,
83 Hun. 593, 31 N.Y.Supp. 1060 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
12. P. Lorillard Co. v. Weingarden, 280 Fed. 238 (W.D.N.Y. 1922).
13. Bitterman v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 207 U.S. 205 (1907).
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Of similar effect are the decisions wherein such restrictions are enforced
against the purchaser with notice by injunction,'14 no distinction being made
between those restrictions upon personal as opposed to real property. 1
"The reason for this is not because (the purchaser) has covenanted not
to use it but because he cannot trespass on the special rights which he
knew another had in the property when he bought it."18
One of the leading cases involving a ship is Lord Strathcona S.S. Co. v.
Dominion Coal Co.17 in which the owner of a ship agreed to charter
the vessel to the plaintiff for operation on the St. Lawrence River for a
number of years. The vessel was sold to several successive owners, one
of whom attempted to repudiate the charter party. The Privy Council
(the court of last resort for British Commonwealth nations beyond the
seas) held the covenant good, stating that the vessel was not bought as
a free ship and that a buyer could not extinguish a right in a vessel
of which lie had notice.',
A recent article' 9 discussing the Strathcona case under the heading
"Contract-Ship-Purchase with Notice of Contract of Charter" points out
that the wide doctrine which was approved and applied as a principle of
equity in the Strathcona case had its origin in the famous statement by
Knight Bruce L.. in the case of De Mattos v. Gibson.
20
Reason and justice seem to prescribe that, at least as a general
rule, where a man, by gift or purchase, acquires property from
another, with knowledge of a previous contract, lawfully and for
valuable consideration made by him with a third person, to use
and employ the property for a particular purpose in a specified
manner, the acquirer shall not . . .use and employ the property
in a manner not allowable to the giver or seller.
The article discusses Tulk v. Moxhay2' and the other English cases and
then points out that the nisi prius court in Port Line Ltd. v. Ben Line
Steamers, Ltd.2 2 had refused to follow the Strathcona case.
14. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (Zd Cir. 1955);
In re Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 48 F.2d 704 (2d Cit. 1931);
P. Lorillard Co. v. Weingarden. 280 Fed. 238, (W.D.N.Y. 1922); Vetzel v. Brown,
86 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1956); Weissman v. Lincoln Corp., 76 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1954);
'Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937); Oliver
v. Hewitt 191 Va. 163, 60 S.E.2d 1 (1950); see also cases cited in Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d
516 (195b).
15. The American encyclopedias, Corpus Juris and Corpus luris Secundum, make
no distinction as to restrictions on real and personal property, including both tinder the
same heading, 32 C.J. Injunctions § 315 (1923), 43 C.I.S. Injunctions 387 (1945).
16. New York Phonograph Co. v. Davega, 127 App. Div. 222, Il N.Y.Supp. 363
(1908).
17. [19261 A.C. 108 (P.C.).
18. Id. at 117; accord, Great Lakes & St. Lawrence Transp. Co. v. Scranton Coal
Co., 239 Fed. 603 (7th Cit. 1917).
19. [Nov. 1958] Camb. L.J. 169.
20. 4 De G. & J. 276, 45 Eng. Rep. 108 (Ch. 1859).
21. 2 Phil Ch. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
22. [19581 2 Q.B.D. 146.
UNIVEI6ITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XIV
It appears that since the Privy Council has appellate jurisdiction of
British Commonwealth cases only, technically the other English Courts
are not bound by its decision. However, irrespective of the views of the
nisi prius court in the Port Line case, the English Court of Appeal (which
has immediate appellate jurisdiction over the Court which decided the
Port Line case,) has said in Bendall v. Mc\Vhirter:23
I know that some people have looked askance at the principles
laid down in the Strathcona case, but there were on the Board of
the Privy Council, three of the most distinguished equity lawyers
of the day, and I fail to see why we should not follow the
principles there laid down . . . , especially as they are so eminently
just and reasonable. (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, thie Strathcona decision was cited and quoted with approval
by Judge Augustus N. Hand in his opinion for the court in In Re Waterson,
Berlin 6 Snyder Co.2 4
Before the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida in the case of Tri-Continental v. Tropical Marine25 the question
was squarely presented as to whcthcr a mortgagee, which had notice of
a restrictive covenant of this kind when it advanced the money for the
purchase of a vessel, the ABACO QUEEN, was hound by the restrictive
covenant under which the vessel was not to be used for certain purposes
for ten years between certain southeastern states and Cuba. The District
Court flatly held . "that not only was this a valid covenant as between
the original parties, but that it is an equitable servitude, valid and binding
on subsequent purchasers with notice."261 (Emphasis added.) The court
cited the Tulk,27 Capitol Records,28 Lord Stratheona29 and Great Lakes 6
St. Lawrence Transportation0 cases. On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit unanimously affirmed the proposition
that the restrictive covenant was valid even under the anti-trust laws,
and by a 2-1 decision held that the mortgagee was bound by the covenant
even though its mortgage contained no express reference thereto.3 1 The
court indicated by dictum that were it necessary, it would have upheld
the principle that an equitable servitude of this kind on a chattel is
binding on a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee with notice, stating
that "appellant makes too much of early and over-technical conmon law
considerations distinguishing between covenants with respect to chattels
23. 119521 2 Q.B.D. 466, 482 (C.A.).
24. 48 F.2d 704' 708 (2d Cir. 1931).
25. 164 F.Supp. 1 (S.D. Fla. 1958), af'd, 265 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1959).
26. Id. at 2.
27. Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. Ch. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
28. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
29. Lord Strathcona S.S. Co. v. Dominion Coal Co., [19261 A.C. 108 (P.C.).
30. Great Lakes & St. Lawrence Transp. Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 239 Fed. 603
(7th Cir. 1917).
31. Tri-Continental Financial Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enterprises" Inc., 265 F.2d
619 (5th Cir. 1959).
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and those with respect to land, too little of equitable considerations in
dealing with both." 32 (Emphasis added.) However, the majority rested
its decision on the ground that under the facts of the Tri-Continental case
the mortgagee having furnished the funds with which to make the
purchase, with full notice of the covenant, it was bound by equitable
considerations, and that under the circumstances a great deal more would
have to be put forward by the mortgagee "to rid the vessel and the parties
dealing with it of the covenant, than the dry as dust and technical common
law distinction between chattels and realty."'33 (Emphasis added.) One
judge dissented on the ground that "there is a rational basis of continuing
validity for the traditional difference between the principle of law which
permits the burdening of real estate with restrictive covenants and that
which favors the sale of tangible personal property unencumbered by even
known restrictive covenants. ,,s4
But there is sound reason for holding that ships are particularly
susceptible to the imposition of restrictive covenants. Ships differ sharply
from some other kinds of chattels (such as radios, television sets, furniture,
and the myriad of items that are purchased by sample, from catalog, or
from the retailer's shelf) to which title passes by delivery. Transfer of
title by delivery would be difficult'if such goods were subjected to equitable
servitudes.33 But ships generally are not sold in this way. The method
of dealing with ships closely resembles that with real property. The
ownership and registry of a vessel as well as mortgages, liens, and other
encumbrances are recorded at the customs house at the ship's home port.
The parties enter into a contract looking to the purchase and sale of a
specific vessel, a title search is then made and the bill of sale and other
documents of title are delivered at a pre-arranged date. The bill of sale
is recorded and filed at the home port, or lodged with the appropriate
government official. An equitable servitude or restriction on the use or
operation of the vessel would merely be one of a great many possible
encumbrances for the ascertainment of which the title search would be made.
The proposition that equitable servitudes should not be permitted to
impede the free transfer of title is thus plainly inapplicable to ships.
Indeed, ships are subject to a wide variety of maritime liens that are
binding even upon purchasers for value without notice.36 Moreover, by
the Ship Mortgage Act 37 "the preferred mo a gage lien shall have priority
32. Id. at 625.
33. Id. at 626.
34. Id. at 626-27.
35. See John D. Park & Sons v. Hartman. 153 Fed. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907); National
Skee-Ball Co. y. Sevfried, 110 N.J. Eq. 18, 158 AtI. 736 (1932).
36. XV. A. Marshall & Co. v. S.S. "President Arthur." 279 U.S. 564, 568 (1928);
Plamals v. S.S. "Pinar Del Rio," 277 U.S. 151, 156 (1928); 1 BENEDCT, ADIAtTRALY
. 26 (6th cd. 1940), "The maritime lien is often secret and unrecorded and the bulk
of these liens operate adversely to the riehts of nOrttgaZees and purchasers without notice."
37. 41 Stat. 1000 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 911 (1958).
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over all claims against the vessel, except (1) preferred maritime liens ...
And the Act defines a preferred maritime lien as, inter alia:
a lien for damages arising out of tort, for wages of a stevedore
when employed directly by the owner, operator, master, ship's
husband, or agent of the vessel, for wages of the crew of the
vessel, for general average, and for salvage, including contract
salvage.a9
In light of the maritime law's many impediments to the free transfer
of title to ships, the objection interposed in a limited class of cases to
equitable servitudes plainly has no validity when applied to a ship.
From a very careful consideration of the authorities therefore it would
appear safe to assert that (1) there is no real doubt as to the validity
under the anti-trust laws, or otherwise, of a restrictive covenant, reasonable
in time and extent, embodied in the sale of a vessel, and (2) a purchaser
or mortgagee who takes with notice of such a covenant is bound thereby.
38. 41 Stat. 1004 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 953(b) () (1958).
39. 41 Stat. 1004 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 953(a)( 2) (1958).
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